Tadao Takahashi foi quem planejou e conduziu a implantação da Internet no Brasil. Criador e coordenador-geral da Rede Nacional de Pesquisas, do Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia. Foi membro fundador do Comitê Gestor Internet e, em segundo mandato, co-responsável pela formalização do NIG.BR (grupo que opera a internet brasileira). Foi o coordenador-geral do Programa Sociedade da Informação (1999-2003), da Presidência da República. É presentemente membro do Advisory Panel da Global Alliance on ICTs for Development (GAID) das Nações Unidas e consultor de vários projetos da Comissão Européia (X-CROSS, WINGS, etc.) envolvendo tecnologia, educação e sociedade.

Tadao não vota em São Paulo, mas considera que Marta está no caminho certo propondo internet sem fio, de graça, na cidade.

Respondendo aos detratores e, indiretamente, aos jornais que jogam “dúvidas”, em relação a consistência das propostas defendidas por Marta, Tadeo Takahashi elaborou um texto do qual reproduzo a parte final aqui. LF

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Quase 20 anos após a unificação, capital alemã busca imagem de cidade tecnológica e tem internet até nos restos do Muro

Lucas Pretti - Berlim - Caderno LINK - O Estado de São Paulo

Você olha para a frente e vê o Portão de Brandemburgo, uma das antigas entradas do reino da Prússia. Foi ali, em 1987, que o ex-presidente norte-americano Ronald Reagan pediu que a Rússia desistisse da Guerra Fria: “Sr. Gorbachev, abra este portão”. História pura.

Logo atrás está o Bundestag (Parlamento) restaurado, com sua impressionante cúpula de vidro, a nova Chancelaria (governo federal) e, mais além, do outro lado do rio Spree, a Hauptbahnhof.

A construção futurista, que chama atenção pela gigantesca parede de vidro e em arco, foi inaugurada em 2006 e detém o título de maior e mais moderna estação de trem da Europa. Tudo lá dentro é transparente. É um marco da capital alemã pós-unificação (1990), que quer ser associada à modernidade.

Diante de tantos marcos do passado e do presente de Berlim, o visitante baixa os olhos e vê o resultado dessa mistura entre tradição e avanço tecnológico. Dezenas de terminais de acesso gratuito à internet estão espalhados pela cidade, alguns bem aqui, na avenida Unter den Linden.

É só tocar na tela e navegar sem fazer cadastro – pelo tempo que quiser. Nos terminais, colocados em pontos de ônibus e bondes, estações de trem e praças, é possível enviar mensagens de graça, consultar mapas e guias de shows e restaurantes. Agora, a parte “velho mundo”: não há filas nem vandalismo.

Após sucessivos traumas históricos, Berlim levou pouco tempo para mudar. O Muro foi derrubado em 1989 e, menos de 20 anos depois, as referências ao nazismo, a preconceitos de todas as ordens e à violência física, política e moral que dividia as Alemanhas são lembradas com respeito histórico em centenas de memoriais e museus. E só. Tudo o que sobra quer estar ligado à inovação e a um futuro de paz e prosperidade.

A rede de terminais de acesso gratuito à internet Bluespot (www.bluespot.de) foi instalada em 2005 pela empresa Wall AG (www.wall.de), especializada em mobiliário urbano, e conta hoje com 64 computadores em Berlim. Não cobrar pelo uso irrestrito é o que há de revolucionário no serviço, o que fez as lan houses sumirem do mapa e estimulou cibercafés como a rede Dunkin’ Donuts a oferecer redes Wi-Fi gratuitas a clientes.

Isso quando a rede sem fio já não é fornecida pela própria prefeitura. No Sony Center, moderno complexo de lojas, restaurantes, cinemas, hotéis e museus na Potsdamer Platz, é possível se conectar sem pagar nada nem obter senha. É só fazer como a garota da foto ao lado: sentar, abrir o notebook e navegar. Se quiser completar com uma cerveja alemã, há várias choperias em volta.

THE WALL
Um dia, o Muro de Berlim já foi símbolo de separação, mas a coisa mudou tanto que, hoje, a mania é se conectar, por meio do pouco que sobrou dele, a outras pessoas que vivem ou passam pela cidade. Visitantes do mundo todo vão aos resquícios da construção, na East Side Gallery, em Kreuzberg, para deixar gravados na parede e-mails ou endereços de sites e blogs.

Quem garante, porém, que os sites são verdadeiros e representam a intenção de seus autores de “falar” com outros turistas? Pois o Link enviou e-mails para a maioria dos endereços pichados e… o pessoal respondeu.

“Estive lá no ano passado, decidi escrever o e-mail por diversão e para ver se alguém me respondia. Acabei recebendo várias mensagens”, conta a estudante sueca Alma Helgesson, de 16 anos. Jovem, superconectada e impulsionada por algo que ela nem sabe o quê: é o perfil de quem deixa o e-mail no muro.

“Estou feliz que você tenha visto o meu e-mail”, respondeu a alemã Britta Adrians, de 17 anos, moradora de Hamburgo que estuda hoje na Nova Zelândia. E bombardeou este repórter com perguntas e uma simpatia incomum a alemães no contato não-virtual. Mais maduro, o designer e ilustrador espanhol Pablo Vallejo, de 33 anos, usou o Muro para divulgar seu blog yonosoytupadre.blogspot.com.

Aos poucos, numa mescla curiosa entre acaso e políticas oficiais, Berlim passa da dor cinza do passado às cores carregadas de promessas da tecnologia.

Medidas devem ajudar a tranqüilizar o mercado financeiro mundial

José Meirelles Passos*, Nadja Sampaio e Ramona Ordoñez - O Globo

WASHINGTON e RIO. O pacote de ajuda anunciado ontem pelo governo americano às gigantes do setor hipotecário foi bem recebido por analistas. Eles avaliam que a intervenção na Fannie Mae e na Freddie Mac era inevitável e poderá ajudar a tranqüilizar os mercados. O socorro também foi apoiado pelo Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI).

Em nota, o diretor-gerente do Fundo, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, afirmou que o organismo ainda estava estudando os detalhes do pacote, mas elogiou a atitude, definindo-a como “uma ação decisiva”, que ajudará a apoiar os mercados “e a perspectiva econômica e financeira”.
Num sinal de que os mercados financeiros devem receber bem as medidas, as ações da Bolsa de Nova York subiam quase 2% no pregão eletrônico de futuros ontem à noite.

Para especialistas brasileiros, ao ajudar a tranqüilizar o mercado americano, o pacote do governo dos EUA será, por tabela, positivo para o Brasil.

— Este socorro foi importante porque acalma a economia americana e sinaliza para o mundo que a crise está sob controle — afirma Aloísio Araújo, professor da Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV).

Analistas prevêem alta de 0,75 ponto percentual na Selic

Araújo explica que o mercado americano tem, por tradição, organismos reguladores fortes. Mas que, neste caso, demoraram a agir.

— O erro começou antes. As empresas eram privadas, mas tinham garantia implícita do governo americano, que deixou de agir quando deveria.
Agora, era inevitável.

O economista-chefe do WestLB no Brasil, Roberto Padovani, acha que a intervenção é boa para os EUA e, se afetar o Brasil, será apenas a curto prazo, com a valorização do dólar pressionando o real. Padovani não acredita que as medidas influenciarão o Banco Central (BC) brasileiro na sua decisão sobre a taxa de juros. O BC se reúne esta semana para fixar a nova Taxa Selic e, para Padovani, deverá repetir a alta de 0,75 ponto percentual, como na última reunião.

Mas, para Carlos Thadeu de Freitas, ex-diretor do BC, as medidas nos EUA poderão afetar negativamente o Brasil. Ele avalia que a crise americana está longe de terminar. E também prevê alta de 0,75 ponto percentual nos juros brasileiros.

— A economia mundial está reduzindo seu ritmo, e isso já se reflete no Brasil. Essa situação, aliada a uma alta exagerada dos juros, poderá desaquecer demais nossa economia.

Nos EUA, os candidatos à presidência apoiaram com ressalvas o socorro do governo. O democrata Barack Obama afirmou que se tratava de uma “medida necessária”, mas destacou que era preciso preservar os contribuintes. O republicano John McCain avaliou a medida como um “passo na direção correta”, mas disse que, no futuro, Fannie e Freddie deveriam ser privatizadas, segundo declarações de seu conselheiro econômico Douglas Holtz-Eakin. O presidente George W. Bush afirmou que o socorro era necessário para evitar que Fannie ou Freddie fossem à falência, o que seria um “risco inaceitável”.

(*) Correspondente

Suffering a seizure

Sep 8th 2008 | NEW YORK
From Economist.com

America’s government takes control of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae

AFP

FOR many Americans, Sunday is for church, family lunches or catching a ball game. For the country’s financial authorities, it has become the day of the dramatic announcement: the takeover of Bear Stearns; the Treasury’s promise in July to stand behind Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; and, most momentous of all, on Sunday September 7th, what had recently come to be seen the inevitable culmination of that pledge: the government’s seizure of the two giant mortgage agencies.

Hank Paulson, the Treasury secretary, had hoped that the July announcement would calm nerves sufficiently that he would not have to take out his “bazooka”. The opposite happened. The firms’ shares collapsed amid fears that investors would be wiped out in a government rescue. This severely curtailed their ability to issue much-needed capital, also infecting their mortgage-backed securities and the $1.6 trillion of debt they had issued to buy mortgages for themselves. It was only a matter of time before the government was forced to launch its largest-ever financial rescue. The action was greeted warmly on the world’s stockmarkets, which rallied on the news.

Though some had wanted to see the agencies fully nationalised, obstacles stood in the way—not least that this would have required an act of Congress. So the Treasury had to get creative. The plan has four planks. First, Fannie and Freddie will be taken into “conservatorship”, a watered-down form of receivership, by their revamped regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, until they are once again “sound and solvent”. Second, they will have access to a loan facility, secured against their assets, until the end of 2009. Intriguingly, this will also be available to the 12 Federal Home Loan Banks. James Lockhart, the FHFA’s head, stressed that these bank-owned co-operatives, also designed to grease housing markets, are mostly in good shape. But they have a lot of short-term debt and the quality of their borrowers’ collateral is falling. Allowing them to tap the credit line may be a shrewd precautionary measure.

The third plank highlights Mr Paulson’s wish to protect the taxpayer and avoid “moral hazard”. The Treasury will buy preferred shares as needed, whenever the agencies’ net worth dips below zero, and this paper will be repaid ahead of their existing preferred and common stock (whose dividends are being eliminated). Lowly shareholders could yet lose everything.

Indeed, the deal could have been a lot worse for the taxpayer. In exchange for vowing to keep the firms above water, the government will receive $1 billion “fee” in preferred stock at no cost, along with warrants giving it the right to 80% of the firms’ common stock at a nominal price. The two chief executives will leave. Fannie and Freddie, whose unparalleled political connections helped them to keep regulation toothless and expand on threadbare capital cushions, will no longer be allowed to lobby lawmakers.

The final piece of the plan may unnerve some taxpayers. To keep mortgage markets chugging along, the Treasury will become a buyer of last resort for bonds packaged by the agencies, purchasing them in the open market if demand slackens. Could it end up burdened with piles of toxic paper? Mr Paulson was upbeat, pointing out that since the Treasury would hold the securities to maturity it might one day reap net gains.

But the eventual cost to the public purse is unknown and potentially huge. The Treasury says it could buy as much as $100 billion of preferred stock in each of the two firms, though it deems that highly unlikely. Ultimately, the size of the bill will depend on their ability to recover, and that is far from clear. Under American accounting standards they have adequate capital, despite the rapid deterioration of their portfolios. But on a fair-value basis, marking their assets to the current market price, Freddie is insolvent and Fannie not far off. Moreover, with house prices still sliding and foreclosures rising sharply, worse may be ahead.

The taxpayer is on the hook elsewhere, too. Bank failures, almost unheard of in recent years, are ticking up. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which steps in and covers deposits up to $100,000 when lenders go belly-up, is nervously watching its fund shrink. It, too, may soon need to tap the Treasury for funds, especially if a big bank fails. On Monday one of the most vulnerable large lenders, Washington Mutual, forced out its boss in a bid to shore up confidence. More and more pundits are predicting the return in new guise of the Resolution Trust Corporation, which was tasked with taking over and offloading duff assets in the savings and loan crisis of the early 1990s. The tab this time is likely to far exceed that institution’s total losses, $124 billion by the end of 1999.

While the short-term goal is to stabilise Fannie and Freddie, thereby bringing down mortgage rates, the longer-term aim should be to avoid an expensive repeat. Mr Paulson stressed that the seizure of the agencies is merely a “time out”; it will be for the next administration and Congress to determine their future form. He is clearly in favour of scrapping their hybrid business model, which delivers profits to shareholders but leaves the public to shoulder life-threatening losses. Both presidential candidates have joined the criticism, with Barack Obama calling the agencies “a weird blend”.

Winding them down is not yet an option. With private mortgage finance barely registering a pulse, Fannie and Freddie have become crucial cogs in the market. Acknowledging this, the Treasury’s plan envisages allowing them to increase the size of their portfolios modestly by the end of next year. But from 2010 they will be forced to shrink by 10% a year until they reach an undefined “less risky size”. Once markets recover, pressure to dismantle the firms—and nurture alternatives, such as covered bonds—will grow. Until then, conservatorship will have to do

O Estado de São Paulo

William Poole, ex-presidente do Federal Reserve Bank de St. Louis, disse ontem que as medidas anunciadas pelo governo dos EUA para socorrer as agências Fannie Mae e Freddie Mac equivalem a estatizá-las. Poole afirmou, em entrevista à Dow Jones, que as medidas anunciadas no fim de semana eram “absolutamente necessárias”, tendo em vista que o colapso das duas agências seria catastrófico para o sistema financeiro. Para ele, elas estão “efetivamente em concordata”.

Poole lembrou que outra conseqüência das medidas é o fato de a dívida emitida por Fannie Mae e Freddie Mac agora terem o mesmo status dos títulos do Tesouro americano. “Na prática, as obrigações de Fannie Mae e Freddie Mac agora são obrigações de crédito plenas do governo dos EUA, porque não será permitido que elas entrem em falência.”

Para todos efeitos práticos, as agências “estão sendo nacionalizadas”, disse Poole, que hoje é pesquisador do Cato Institute.

O ex-dirigente do Fed disse ainda que a intervenção federal na Fannie Mae e na Freddie Mac, após os esforços do Fed para socorrer o banco de investimentos Bear Stearns, compromete a capacidade de avaliação de riscos de Wall Street. “O país está agora em situação muito ruim em termos de risco moral. Os credores sabem que serão protegidos em caso de circunstâncias adversas.”

Segundo Poole, agora ficou claro que algumas empresas são julgadas grandes demais para falir, embora exista pouca clareza sobre qual é o tamanho-limite para uma intervenção do governo.

Por Ernani Teixeira Torres Filho e Gilberto Rodrigues Borça Junior - VALOR

No último mês de maio, o secretário do Tesouro dos EUA, Henry Paulson, e importantes colunistas internacionais de economia, como Paul Krugman (”The New York Times”) e Anatoli Kaletski (”The Times”), se sentiram confortáveis para anunciar que o pior da atual crise financeira - a crise do subprime - já havia passado. No entanto, no início de junho, essa visão otimista foi abalada pelos rumores de que, novamente, outro grande banco de investimento americano - dessa vez o Lehman Brothers - estava enfrentando dificuldades.

Esse evento marca mais uma etapa em uma crise cheia de surpresas. De fato, em maio de 2007, aos primeiros sinais de turbulência, Ben Bernanke, presidente do Banco Central americano (Fed), afirmou que “o efeito dos problemas no segmento subprime sobre o mercado imobiliário como um todo será, provavelmente, limitado, e não esperamos conseqüências significativas para o resto da economia ou do sistema financeiro”. Assim, na sua visão inicial, o impacto da crise do subprime no mercado financeiro e na economia norte-americana como um todo seria bastante limitado.

Entretanto, quatro meses depois, Bernanke já demonstrava apreensão. Em agosto, alertava que “vários eventos que se seguiram à crise do subprime levaram os investidores a acreditar que o risco de crédito poderia ser maior e mais difundido do que se pensava anteriormente. A liquidez foi reduzida significativamente e as taxas de risco (spreads) aumentaram”.

A crise atingiu seu auge em março de 2008, com a quebra do quinto maior banco de investimento americano, o Bear Stearns. Nessa oportunidade, não só o diagnóstico, mas principalmente a atitude do Fed, sofreu profunda modificação. Surpreendentemente, o Banco Central americano, em uma mudança de atitude gestada durante um fim de semana, assumiu US$ 30 bilhões de créditos do Bear Stearns, evitando sua falência e facilitando sua aquisição pelo JP Morgan Chase. Esse fato representou uma alteração dramática no marco regulatório do sistema financeiro norte-americano. O Bear Stearns, por se tratar de um banco de investimento, e não de um banco comercial, não estava formalmente sob a jurisdição do Fed, mas mesmo assim foi objeto de intervenção.

Se o problema dos créditos podres parece ter passado, ainda restam a deflação dos ativos e a baixa liquidez dos bancos

O estopim da crise financeira foi o aparecimento dos créditos “podres” do mercado imobiliário americano, os chamados subprimes, que estavam, até então, “escondidos” em mecanismos complexos e pouco transparentes de securitização de créditos, os chamados produtos financeiros estruturados - como os CDOs (Collateralized Debt Obligation) e as SIVs (Structured Investment Vehicles). Esse fenômeno foi, em boa medida, um resultado do aumento das taxas de juros e, conseqüentemente, da queda dos preços dos imóveis nos EUA. As perdas anunciadas até o momento somam cerca de US$ 400 bilhões e estes valores tendem a aumentar nos próximos meses.

A surpresa do Fed com a dimensão da crise financeira americana lembra o estouro da bolha imobiliária japonesa de 1989. A exemplo dos EUA, o Banco Central japonês aumentou as taxas de juros para reduzir o processo especulativo que alimentava a alta no preço das residências e, do mesmo modo que o Fed, foi surpreendido pela gravidade da crise que se seguiu. No caso do Japão, todos os grandes bancos japoneses chegaram a estar tecnicamente falidos, e há quase duas décadas a economia local está praticamente estagnada.

A despeito dessas semelhanças, não há sinais de que o problema econômico americano venha a adquirir dimensões “japonesas”. Até o momento, o pragmatismo das autoridades dos EUA e da Europa impediu que a crise em curso comprometesse seriamente o funcionamento, tanto da economia americana quanto da internacional. Mesmo assim, pode ser um pouco cedo para afirmar que “o pior já passou”.

Se o problema dos créditos subprime parece já não ser mais o ponto central da crise, ainda estão em operação dois outros importantes mecanismos de alimentação: o processo de deflação dos ativos e a baixa liquidez dos bancos. Esses fenômenos geram graves limitações ao funcionamento dos mercados de crédito. Enquanto não for possível ter segurança sobre o valor das residências, ações e títulos privados, os investidores tenderão a se manter retraídos. Do mesmo modo, enquanto a “liquidez de médio prazo” dos bancos (superior a 28 dias) não estiver definitivamente atendida, a tensão continuará a bloquear o crédito.

Apesar de ainda estar em curso, a análise da crise já permite que se tire pelo menos duas lições importantes. A primeira é que o arcabouço regulatório em uso e em discussão - Basiléia I e II - precisa ser repensado, particularmente no que diz respeito à capacidade de auto-regulação do mercado. A segunda diz respeito ao financiamento dos investimentos em economias emergentes que, como o Brasil, estão em processo de aceleração do crescimento. É importante garantir que o atual ciclo de investimento continue sendo sustentado por mecanismos domésticos de financiamento. Assim, são elevados os riscos de se voltar a depender em demasia de fundos externos para financiar os grandes projetos industriais e de infra-estrutura em curso.

Ernani Teixeira Torres Filho e Gilberto Rodrigues Borça Júnior são, respectivamente, superintendente e economista da Área de Pesquisa Econômica (APE) do BNDES. Vide informe Visão do Desenvolvimento nº 50 ( www.bndes.gov.br/conhecimento/ publicações/catalogo.asp )

Plano anunciado ontem prevê ajuda financeira a Fannie Mae e Freddie Mac e que o governo possa comprar suas ações

Empresas, que possuem ou garantem metade das hipotecas do país, poderão tomar emprestado dinheiro do Fed a juros mais baixos

STEPHEN LABATON
DO “NEW YORK TIMES’

FOLHA DE SÃO PAULO

Alarmado com o acentuado desgaste de confiança nas duas maiores empresas de crédito hipotecário dos EUA, o governo Bush pediu ontem ao Congresso para aprovar um pacote de socorro que lhe autorizará a comprar bilhões de dólares em ações da Fannie Mae e da Freddie Mac e também emprestar às companhias para suprir suas necessidades de financiamento em curto prazo.
Segundo o plano, anunciado ontem pelo secretário do Tesouro, Henry Paulson, após um fim de semana de discussões com outras autoridades sobre a crise, as duas empresas poderão tomar dinheiro emprestado com taxa de juros mais baixas do Fed (o BC dos EUA).
Mais amplo que o esperado por analistas, o anúncio ocorreu antes da abertura dos mercados asiáticos, em tentativa de reduzir perdas das empresas e do mercado em razão das preocupações com os resultados das empresas hipotecárias e, conseqüentemente, com a estabilidade da economia em geral.
O plano pede que o Congresso dê ao governo autorização nos próximos dois anos para comprar uma quantidade não-especificada de ações das duas companhias. No período, o plano permitiria que as duas companhias tenham maior acesso a recursos do Tesouro, expandindo suas linhas de crédito.
Cada companhia tem hoje uma linha de crédito de US$ 2,25 bilhões, definida quase 40 anos atrás pelo Congresso. Na época, a Fannie tinha cerca de US$ 15 bilhões em dívidas a pagar. Hoje tem uma dívida total de aproximadamente US$ 800 bilhões, enquanto a Freddie deve cerca de US$ 740 bilhões.
Hoje as duas companhias também detêm ou garantem hipotecas avaliadas em mais de US$ 5 trilhões no país.
Como parte do plano, o governo também pedirá que o Congresso aumente o limite da dívida nacional. E que o Congresso dê ao Fed participação na definição de regras sobre o tamanho das reservas de capital que cada empresa deve ter.

Recado ao mercado
Dar ao Fed um papel de consultor na supervisão das companhias é visto como mais uma maneira de tranqüilizar os mercados nervosos.
O governo Bush espera que o Congresso aprove rapidamente o novo plano, como parte da medida para ajudar o mercado habitacional e reformular as normas de Fannie Mae e Freddie Mac. Na sexta, o Senado aprovou a medida, e a Câmara espera discuti-la nesta semana.
O anúncio do plano no início da noite de ontem teve a intenção de enviar um forte sinal aos mercados de que o governo apóia as duas empresas.
Durante o fim de semana, autoridades graduadas do Tesouro e do Federal Reserve monitoraram de perto os preparativos para que a Freddie Mac levantasse dinheiro para ajudar suas necessidades de fundos em curto prazo. Autoridades passaram o sábado e o domingo sendo informadas sobre o apetite de Wall Street por uma oferta de dívida de US$ 3 bilhões pela Freddie Mac que estava marcada para hoje.
As autoridades disseram estar observando para avaliar se as fortes quedas das ações das duas empresas na semana passada poderiam contagiar o mercado de dívida e minar a confiança dos credores.
A Fannie Mae e a Freddie Mac tornaram-se centrais para os mercados de habitação do país. Elas compram hipotecas de bancos e outros credores, seguram algumas delas e vendem outras na forma de títulos lastreados por hipotecas. Juntas, elas possuem ou garantem cerca da metade das hipotecas dos Estados Unidos.
Nos últimos meses, as ações das duas companhias despencaram quando uma onda de execuções de hipotecas erodiu a confiança nas mesmas.

ANÁLISE

DO “FINANCIAL TIMES” - FOLHA DE SÃO PAULO

COM O preço do barril de petróleo acima de US$ 146 e a oscilação nos mercados mundiais de ações, o tumulto na economia mundial se agravou durante esta semana. Mas o acontecimento mais notável foi o fato de que velhos pecados socialistas agora terão de ser pagos nos Estados Unidos, a terra do capitalismo de livre mercado.
Os problemas afetam duas empresas de financiamento hipotecário coloquialmente conhecidas como Freddie Mac e Fannie Mae e definidas como “empresas patrocinadas pelo governo”. O significado exato dessa descrição pode ser revelado em breve.
Com um passivo combinado de US$ 5,3 trilhões, o equivalente a cerca de 38% do PIB (Produto Interno Bruto) dos Estados Unidos, essas imensas companhias são universalmente vistas como grandes demais para falir.
Já que respondem por cerca de três quartos das novas hipotecas, elas também são importantes demais para que se permita que cheguem à falência.
Caso deixem de existir, o mercado de habitação poderia entrar em colapso, devastando a estabilidade financeira norte-americana.
Mas, se o governo federal tiver de incorporar as dívidas das duas empresas às suas contas, seu passivo financeiro bruto passaria a exceder os 100% do PIB. Felizmente, as coisas ainda não se agravaram a esse ponto, já que os ativos das duas instituições continuam a ter valor.
O verdadeiro problema, demonstrado pela queda vertiginosa nos preços de suas ações, é que o capital de que dispõem parece insuficiente para sustentar seus passivos, dada a escala dos possíveis prejuízos.
William Poole, ex-presidente do Federal Reserve de St. Louis, argumentou nesta semana que a Freddie Mac teria de ser considerada insolvente caso o valor de seus ativos fosse estimado a preços de mercado.
Se for acatada a suposição de que manter a capacidade das duas gigantes para emprestar é fundamental, existam apenas duas saídas: as duas teriam de levantar imensos montantes em capital adicional ou o governo teria de garantir seus passivos de maneira explícita.
Em seu depoimento ao Congresso nesta semana, Ben Bernanke, presidente do Federal Reserve, encorajou as duas instituições a levantar dinheiro.
Isso certamente seria dispendioso para os acionistas existentes e arriscado para os novos. O governo mesmo poderia investir nessa operação de aumento de capital. Alternativamente, o governo poderia assumir controle direto sobre uma ou ambas as empresas, presumivelmente zerando o valor das ações em circulação.
O nome do processo, aparentemente, seria “conservadoria”. Do lado oposto do Atlântico, o termo usado seria “nacionalização”. E a decisão faria com que a nacionalização do Northern Rock pelo governo britânico parecesse não mais do que uma bagatela.
Os problemas da Fannie Mae e Freddie Mac são importantes em si. Mas são ainda mais importantes pelo que nos dizem sobre a crise em curso: ela continua a se expandir. Os preços das casas continuam a cair nos Estados Unidos, os prejuízos do setor financeiro devem aumentar, o crédito continua apertado, a economia norte-americana continua fraca, o consumo domiciliar está sob pressão cada vez mais intensa e os preços do petróleo estão subindo ainda mais.
Enquanto isso, o Departamento do Tesouro e o banco central estão improvisando desesperadamente. Os mercados de ações ao menos perceberam até que ponto as coisas estão difíceis. Apenas os mais otimistas acreditariam que o pior está por vir. A crise, na verdade, está se agravando.

American housing

Map of misery

May 8th 2008 | WASHINGTON, DC
From The Economist print edition

America may well be only halfway through the house-price bust

SOUNDING more like a cartographer than a central banker, Ben Bernanke this week showed off the Federal Reserve’s latest gizmo for tracking America’s property bust: a series of maps that colour-code price declines, foreclosures and other gauges of housing distress for every county in the country. The Fed chairman’s goal was to show graphically that falling prices meant more foreclosures, and he went on to urge lenders to write down the principal on troubled loans where the house is worth less than the value of the mortgage. But the jazzy design of his maps—where hotter colours imply more trouble—also makes a starker point. The pain of America’s housing bust varies enormously by region. Hardest hit have been the “bubble states”—California, Nevada and Florida, as well as parts of the industrial Midwest. The biggest uncertainty hanging over the economy is how red will things get.

The answer is not simple. For a start, it is hard to be sure just how much house prices have fallen. America has several house-price indices and they tell different stories. Widely cited, but least useful, are monthly figures showing median home prices produced by the National Association of Realtors (NAR). These indicate that median prices are down some 13% from their peak, but since these averages do not adjust for the mix of homes changing hands, which fluctuates from month to month, they are inevitably distorted.

Mr Bernanke’s maps use figures from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). Its statistics have broad geographic reach and track repeat sales of the same house. The monthly national index suggests average prices have fallen only 3% from a peak in April 2007, and the quarterly figures are still positive (see left-hand chart). But OFHEO’s figures include only houses financed by mortgages backed by the government-sponsored giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. By excluding subprime and jumbo loans, they leave out the top and bottom of the market—where prices rose fastest during the bubble and where the mortgage mess was most severe. Thus OFHEO’s figures probably understate the scale of the housing mess, particularly in states such as California and Florida. Another set of indices, developed by Robert Shiller and Karl Case and produced by Standard & Poor’s (S&P), a rating agency, includes all types of houses and, not surprisingly, show house prices rising faster during the boom and falling faster now. As of the fourth quarter of 2007, the S&P/Case-Shiller national index was down 10% from its peak, and an index of ten large cities had fallen by almost 16% by February. Although the Case-Shiller figures are not perfect—they miss many rural areas—they are a better gauge of price declines in big cities.

Assessing how much further house prices are likely to fall gets even trickier. One route is to look at market expectations: investors expect a further 20% drop, judging by the prices of futures contracts linked to the Case-Shiller 10 city index. But the futures market is small and illiquid and may overstate the possible declines.

The discrepancy between supply and demand suggests that prices could fall a lot more. By historical standards there is a huge glut of unsold homes on the market. The homeowner-vacancy rate—which includes all vacant homes for sale—has soared to a record level of 2.9%, which means that there are some 1.1m “excess” houses for sale compared with the average between 1985 and 2005. Although the inventory of new homes is falling as builders have slashed their production, the supply of homes for sale is being pushed up by foreclosures even as demand from new homeowners remains weak.

By most measures, prices are still above the levels implied by the fundamentals. Using a model that ties house prices to disposable incomes and long-term interest rates, analysts at Goldman Sachs reckon that the correction in national house prices is only halfway through. They expect an 18-20% correction overall, or another 11-13% decline from today’s levels. But their models suggest that six states—Arizona, Florida, Virginia, Maryland, California and New Jersey, could see further price declines of 25% or more.

Optimists dispute this gloomy assessment, pointing out that some measures of housing affordability have dramatically improved. According to NAR figures, monthly payments on a typical house with a 30-year mortgage and 20% downpayment were 18.5% of the median family’s income in February, down from almost 26% at the peak—and close to the historical average. But this measure of affordability is misleading, not least because credit standards have tightened so much. The latest survey of loan officers conducted by the Fed suggested on May 5th that 60% of banks tightened their lending standards for prime mortgages in the first three months of 2007. And, as Michael Feroli of JPMorgan points out, the affordability gauge depends on what measure of home prices you look at. Use the Case-Shiller index, where the affordability of housing worsened sharply during the boom, and mortgage payments are still high in relation to incomes.

The right-hand chart shows a better measure of housing fundamentals—the relationship between house prices and rents. This is a sort of price/earnings ratio for the housing market: the price of a house reflects the discounted value of future ownership, either as rental income or as rent saved by an owner who lives in the house.

A recent analysis by Morris Davis of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and Andreas Lehnert and Robert Martin of the Fed, shows that the rent/price yield in America ranged between 5% and 5.5% from 1960 to 1995, but fell rapidly thereafter to reach a historic low of 3.5% at the height of the boom. Given the typical pace of rental growth, Mr Feroli reckons house prices (as measured by the Case-Shiller index) need to fall by 10-15% over the next year and a half for the rent/price yield to return to its historical average. Again, that suggests the national housing bust is only halfway through. And, given the scale of excess supply, house prices—particularly in hard hit areas—are likely to overshoot. All told, Mr Bernanke’s maps are going to get a lot redder—and the pressure on policymakers to help struggling homeowners is bound to increase.

By Jonathan Wheatley and Richard Lapper, FT.com site

Published: Feb 21, 2007

Jonathan Wheatley and Richard Lapper, speak to Brazil’s foreign minister Celso Amorim who insists Brazil is not about to adopt 21st century socialism.

(more…)

Brendan Smialowski for The New York Times

Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. presented a series of proposals to overhaul the regulation of Wall Street on Monday in Washington.

By STEPHEN LABATON - The New York Times

Published: March 31, 2008

WASHINGTON — Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. on Monday formally laid out an ambitious plan to overhaul the regulatory apparatus that oversees the nation’s financial system. Senior lawmakers and industry lobbyists predicted that most of the plan would run into difficulty.

The product of a lame-duck Republican administration facing a Democratically controlled Congress, the plan would consolidate federal agencies that regulate the nation’s securities and commodities futures markets and eliminate a third agency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, which oversees savings and loans. It proposes to create a commission that would set new minimum licensing standards for mortgage originators.

By his own account, Mr. Paulson, along with other senior officials, do not want lawmakers to act on the proposal until after the housing crisis is over — and that is likely to be after a new president takes office.

“Some may view these recommendations as a response to the circumstances of the day,” Mr. Paulson said in a speech Monday at the Treasury Department. “That is not how they are intended.”

Democratic leaders are already drafting bills to impose tougher supervision over Wall Street, and some say that Mr. Paulson’s plan does not go far enough in reining in risky practices among banks.

Insurance and some banking groups began over the weekend to formulate plans to oppose various provisions. And several features were criticized by regulators appointed by the Bush administration.

Senior lawmakers, while praising the administration for raising important points for further discussion, said the odds of a major overhaul in the remaining days of the Congressional session were long.

“Since this is opening day in baseball, I might as well make a baseball metaphor,” said Senator Christopher J. Dodd, the Connecticut Democrat who heads the Senate banking committee. “This is a wild pitch. It is not even close to the strike zone.”

Mr. Dodd and other Democrats were hoping to move legislation this week that would help homeowners facing foreclosure.

Still, elements of the Paulson plan — including a proposal to expand the authority of the Federal Reserve to examine investment banks and other financial institutions that have previously roamed free of federal oversight — clearly speak to the recent tumult on Wall Street that has hurt the economy. And President Bush, through his spokeswoman, urged Congress to quickly approve the proposed changes.

“Secretary Paulson has been working on this package for about a year, so it’s not like pulling a rabbit out of a hat,” Dana Perino, the White House press secretary, told reporters on Air Force One on Monday.

The administration’s proposal will do almost nothing to regulate the alphabet soup of sophisticated financial products that have fueled the financial crisis. And it will not rein in practices that have been linked to the mortgage crisis, like packaging risky loans into securities carrying the highest ratings.

Hedge funds and private equity firms, which have enjoyed freedom from government oversight for years, would finally fall under federal watch. But that oversight would be minimal, enabling the government to do little beyond collecting information until a widescale crisis has already occurred.

The checks and balances in the plan reflect the mindset of Mr. Paulson, the plan’s architect, who came to Washington after a long career on Wall Street, including a stint as chief executive of Goldman Sachs.

Mr. Paulson has worried that any effort to substantially tighten regulation could hamper the ability of American markets to compete with foreign rivals — and, in fact, the proposal stemmed from a series of policy discussions that began well before the current tumult that has rocked the nation’s economic underpinnings.

The plan began last year as an effort by Mr. Paulson to streamline the different and sometimes clashing rules for commercial banks, savings and loans and nonbank mortgage lenders.

“This blueprint addresses complex, long-term issues that should not be decided in the midst of stressful situations,” Mr. Paulson said in his remarks on Monday. “These long-term ideas require thoughtful discussion and will not be resolved this month or even this year.”

Mr. Paulson also deflected blame for the current tumult away from the Bush administration. “I do not believe it is fair or accurate to blame our regulatory structure for the current turmoil,” he said.

Under the plan, the Fed would have some authority over Wall Street firms, but only when an investment bank’s practices threatened the financial system as a whole. The Fed would be able to examine internal bookkeeping of brokerage firms, hedge funds, commodity-trading exchanges and any other institution that might pose a risk to the overall financial system.

The plan would also merge the Securities and Exchange Commission with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which regulates exchange-traded futures for oil, grains, currencies and the like. And the blueprint suggests several areas where the S.E.C. should take a lighter approach to its oversight, including allowing stock exchanges greater leeway to regulate themselves.

Some agencies within Washington’s patchwork system of financial regulation would be consolidated. One new agency, which the Treasury calls a “prudential financial regulator,” would focus on the safety of financial institutions that have explicit government guarantees. The other watchdog would oversee business conduct to protect public investors and customers of financial firms.

Congress would have to approve almost every element of the proposal, and Democratic leaders are already drafting their own bills to impose tougher supervision over Wall Street investment banks, hedge funds and the fast-growing market in derivatives like credit default swaps.

Administration officials acknowledged last week that they did not expect the proposal to become law this year, but said they hoped it would help frame a policy debate that would extend well after the elections in November.

By PAUL KRUGMAN - The New York Times

We’re now in the midst of an epic financial crisis, which ought to be at the center of the election debate. But it isn’t.

Now, I don’t expect presidential campaigns to have all the answers to our current crisis — even financial experts are scrambling to keep up with events. But I do think we’re entitled to more answers, and in particular a clearer commitment to financial reform, than we’re getting so far.

In truth, I don’t expect much from John McCain, who has both admitted not knowing much about economics and denied having ever said that. Anyway, lately he’s been busy demonstrating that he doesn’t know much about the Middle East, either.

Yet the McCain campaign’s silence on the financial crisis has disappointed even my low expectations.

And when Mr. McCain’s economic advisers do speak up about the economy’s problems, they don’t inspire confidence. For example, last week one McCain economic adviser — Kevin Hassett, the co-author of “Dow 36,000” — insisted that everything would have been fine if state and local governments hadn’t tried to limit urban sprawl. Honest.

On the Democratic side, it’s somewhat disappointing that Barack Obama, whose campaign has understandably made a point of contrasting his early opposition to the Iraq war with Hillary Clinton’s initial support, has tried to score a twofer by suggesting that the war, in addition to all its other costs, is responsible for our economic troubles.

The war is indeed a grotesque waste of resources, which will place huge long-run burdens on the American public. But it’s just wrong to blame the war for our current economic mess: in the short run, wartime spending actually stimulates the economy. Remember, the lowest unemployment rate America has experienced over the last half-century came at the height of the Vietnam War.

Hillary Clinton has not, as far as I can tell, made any comparably problematic economic claims. But she, like Mr. Obama, has been disappointingly quiet about the key issue: the need to reform our out-of-control financial system.

Let me explain.

America came out of the Great Depression with a pretty effective financial safety net, based on a fundamental quid pro quo: the government stood ready to rescue banks if they got in trouble, but only on the condition that those banks accept regulation of the risks they were allowed to take.

Over time, however, many of the roles traditionally filled by regulated banks were taken over by unregulated institutions — the “shadow banking system,” which relied on complex financial arrangements to bypass those safety regulations.

Now, the shadow banking system is facing the 21st-century equivalent of the wave of bank runs that swept America in the early 1930s. And the government is rushing in to help, with hundreds of billions from the Federal Reserve, and hundreds of billions more from government-sponsored institutions like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Home Loan Banks.

Given the risks to the economy if the financial system melts down, this rescue mission is justified. But you don’t have to be an economic radical, or even a vocal reformer like Representative Barney Frank, the chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, to see that what’s happening now is the quid without the quo.

Last week Robert Rubin, the former Treasury secretary, declared that Mr. Frank is right about the need for expanded regulation. Mr. Rubin put it clearly: If Wall Street companies can count on being rescued like banks, then they need to be regulated like banks.

But will that logic prevail politically?

Not if Mr. McCain makes it to the White House. His chief economic adviser is former Senator Phil Gramm, a fervent advocate of financial deregulation. In fact, I’d argue that aside from Alan Greenspan, nobody did as much as Mr. Gramm to make this crisis possible.

Both Democrats, by contrast, are running more or less populist campaigns. But at least so far, neither Democrat has made a clear commitment to financial reform.

Is that simply an omission? Or is it an ominous omen? Recent history offers reason to worry.

In retrospect, it’s clear that the Clinton administration went along too easily with moves to deregulate the financial industry. And it’s hard to avoid the suspicion that big contributions from Wall Street helped grease the rails.

Last year, there was no question at all about the way Wall Street’s financial contributions to the new Democratic majority in Congress helped preserve, at least for now, the tax loophole that lets hedge fund managers pay a lower tax rate than their secretaries.

Now, the securities and investment industry is pouring money into both Mr. Obama’s and Mrs. Clinton’s coffers. And these donors surely believe that they’re buying something in return.

Let’s hope they’re wrong.

By Michael Hunter and Robert Orr

Financial Times

The FTSE 100 fell sharply on Monday as the fall-out from the rescue of Northern Rock continued to hit the markets.

Other lenders also suffered from the growing crisis of confidence, fuelled by comments from Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, that US house prices were likely to fall “significantly”.

Mr Greenspan’s thoughts, made in an interview with the Financial Times, raised the prospect of further contagion from bad debt within the US housing sector spreading around the globe via complex investment instruments based on American mortgage debt.

In London, Northern Rock lost a further 40 per cent of its value as savers scrambled to withdraw deposits from the bank, with an estimated £2bn withdrawn in just three days.

The Newcastle-based lender’s shares fell by a similar amount on Friday following the shock news that it needed to be bailed out by the Bank of England due to a drying up of liquidity in the capital markets.

Alistair Darling, chancellor of the exchequer, said he stood by the Bank of England’s decision to bail out Northern Rock. In an interview on BBC Radio Four’s Today programme he said the troubled lender could draw from the central bank ”as needed”.

Despite the continuation of talks over a rescue takeover, Northern Rock slumped 40 per cent to a new low of 267p. The shares were worth more than £12 only a few months ago.

With the rest of the banking sector also down sharply, the FTSE 100 fell 101.4 points, or 1.6 per cent, to 6,189.5.

Alliance & Leicester slumped 18.3 per cent to 713p, Bradford & Bingley fell 11.8 per cent to 291p and HBOS, the UK’s biggest mortgage lender, dropped 4.2 per cent to 821½p.

The prospect of more stringent mortgage lending also hampered the house building sector. Barratt Developments fell 7.2 per cent to 769½p, Persimmon lost 5.9 per cent to 956p and Taylor Wimpey was 2.8 per cent weaker at 304.3p.

Pub operator Mitchells & Butler fell 4.7 per cent to 590p after it said hedging costs ahead of an abortive attempt to create a property holding joint venture, mothballed due to the turbulence on world credit markets, would appear as a £140m special item on its annual accounts.

Of the risers, Sage, the information technology company, gained 2.7 per cent to 249¾p after a push from Deutsche Bank.

David Maxwell for The New York Times

Charles and Tammi Eggleston, with their daughters, Shelby and Sydney, have been trying to sell their home in Maple Heights, Ohio, since May 2006. Nearby houses sit vacant.

Published: September 2, 2007 The New York Times

Maple Heights, Ohio

TAMMI and Charles Eggleston never took out a risky mortgage, never borrowed more than they could afford and never missed a monthly payment on their neat, three-bedroom colonial in the Cleveland suburbs. But that hasn’t prevented them from getting caught in the undertow of the subprime mortgage mess now submerging this town.

Over the last 18 months, the Egglestons have watched one house after another on their street, Gardenview Drive, end up foreclosed and vacant. Although lawns are still tidy and empty homes are not boarded up and stripped as they are in inner-city Cleveland, the Egglestons say Maple Heights no longer feels safe after dark. Nor do they have the confidence they had when they moved in a decade ago that this is the ideal place to raise their 6-year-old twin girls, Sydney and Shelby. So, in May 2006, they put their home on the market in order to move closer to Mrs. Eggleston’s parents in another middle-class Cleveland suburb, Richmond Heights.

They have had no takers. Although they lowered the asking price to $99,000 from $109,000, no one has even come to look at it in more than six weeks. “My heart panics every time I drive down the street and I see another for-sale sign,” says Mrs. Eggleston, pointing past the placards in front of her porch to others that dot surrounding yards like lawn furniture. “Some people on the street couldn’t pay, so they just left. The competition to sell is just ridiculous.”

It is a scene being repeated in cities and towns across America as loans that were made to borrowers with little or no credit history, many of whom could not even afford a down payment, fail in ever-growing numbers. It is also a story of how local economic trends are intersecting with national politics, with local foreclosures drawing the attention of Democratic presidential candidates, including John Edwards and Representative Dennis J. Kucinich of Ohio.

On the Republican side, President Bush announced on Friday several steps aimed at alleviating the impact of the subprime crisis on homeowners. In a Rose Garden appearance, he ruled out a federal bailout, citing both “excesses in the lending industry” and unduly optimistic homeowners who took out “loans larger than they could afford,” as reasons for the mortgage woes.

Indeed, what was once a problem confined mostly to economically struggling areas is quickly becoming a national phenomenon. Last year, there were 1.2 million foreclosure filings in the United States, up 42 percent from 2005, according to RealtyTrac, a firm that analyzes such data. At current rates so far this year, RealtyTrac expects foreclosure filings to hit two million in 2007, or roughly one per 62 American households — a rate approaching heights not seen since the Great Depression.

Analysts also say that the fallout from mortgages gone bad is spreading well beyond borrowers now in default. It has begun to engulf middle-class communities like Maple Heights, where nearly 10 percent of the houses — or 910 properties — have been seized by banks in the last two years. And it foreshadows what could lie in store if mortgage holders default on what the Federal Reserve conservatively estimates to be $100 billion in risky subprime loans. Many of these loans were made in 2005 and early 2006, when standards were at their most lax and cities like this were blanketed with aggressive pitches from mortgage providers.

“I don’t think we’ve hit bottom,” says Michael G. Ciaravino, the mayor of Maple Heights. “My fear is that foreclosure rates could go to double where they are today.”

IN terms of the subprime mortgage meltdown, Ohio has been among the hardest-hit states, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association. In Cuyahoga County, which includes Cleveland and surrounding suburbs, roughly 30 percent of subprime mortgages are either delinquent or in foreclosure, says Jim Rokakis, the county treasurer.

But this leafy community of bungalows and small family homes built after World War II could be described as its epicenter. Already, Maple Heights, with a population of 27,000, ranks No. 1 in Cuyahoga County in foreclosures per capita, according to Policy Matters Ohio, a nonprofit research group. Ranked by ZIP code, the number of foreclosures here puts Maple Heights in the top one-half of 1 percent nationally, RealtyTrac says.

Mayor Ciaravino has already had to shut his town’s two swimming pools, cut the ranks of police officers and firefighters and eliminate services like free plowing for senior citizens with snow-covered driveways. More…